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or within real experiment [Chen, Javidi et al. (2014)]. Such key characteristics can be following: a wavelength of 
laser radiation, a pixel size of the amplitude object, propagation distances [Situ, Zhang (2004)] in the free space 
before and after the second phase mask, the spatial phase distribution of the second random phase mask. In some 
variations of the method DRPE additional (or alternate) characteristics can also be used as key parameters, for 
example: polarization properties of the radiation or fractional Fourier orders [Unnikrishnan, Singh (2000)] before 
and after the focal plane of the lens. Consequently, all parameters of the optical scheme acting as an unknown key to 
the potential attacker. 
The cryptanalysis of the encryption strength of algorithms always needs to make the assumption, that a potential 
attacker knows the applied encryption algorithm and some other data. Significantly accelerated numerical method in 
comparison with the direct brute-force attack was proposed within such assumptions on the basis of the revealed 
vulnerability of the DRPE. It allows to break the data encrypted with DRPE for a satisfactory time. The analysis of 
the cryptographic security of the DRPE method was performed in the works [Carnicer et al. (2005); Peng, Wei et al. 
(2006); Peng et al. (2007); Peng, Zhang et al. (2006); Frauel et al. (2007); Qin, Peng (2009); Qin, He et al. (2009)]. 
Revealed weakness of the DRPE algorithm are based on the assumptions that the attacker knows the applied 
encryption algorithm and he has access to one or more pairs of source and encoded images [Qin, He et al. (2009)]. 
Attention of researchers was focused on the further investigation or development of such attacks [Peng, Wei et al. 
(2006); Peng et al. (2007); Peng, Zhang et al. (2006); Frauel et al. (2007); Qin, He et al. (2009); Qin, Peng (2009)]. 
It is known, that due to the multidimensionality of the encryption and decryption, numerical methods for 
breaking the DRPE data with brute-force attack cannot be used at this time because of the high computational 
complexity of such task. Nevertheless, to our best knowledge, usually an unsuccessful methodology is employed to 
provide the analysis of the computational complexity of the brute-force attack on the data encrypted by the DRPE 
method: the direct compare of restored images with the source image was implemented to evaluate the 
computational complexity of the DRPE method. In this context it is obvious, that if someone has a direct access to 
the original image, inherently there is no any need to apply some breaking algorithms. On the other hand, without 
any access to the original image, there is a requirement for some criterion or criteria to check the correctness of the 
chosen combination of parameters on each iteration of the cycle of the breaking algorithm of the numerical brute-
force attack. In this instance, the accuracy and the computational complexity of the brute-force attack with such 
criteria will be different from the described case with the direct comparison. In this paper, we proposed simple and 
reliable criteria to give feedback in the brute-force attack on DRPE, allowing to perform more accurate 
investigations of the particularities of such numerical task. In general, proposed criteria can also be useful for other 
methods relating to image encryption. 
2. Proposed criteria to give a feedback in the brute-force attack on DRPE 
From numerical research conducted in this paper, it is clear that to use the brute-force method the attacker not 
only needs to know the encryption algorithm, he also required some a priori-known information about the source 
image or images. In contrast to the described above methods of cracking DRPE based on the use of its 
vulnerabilities, in this case there is no need to direct access to pairs of the original and encrypted images. In this 
instance, only some general information about the images (e.g. type of the images: binary, picture, text) and/or any 
properties and original image characteristics (statistical or otherwise) may serve as a priori-known information. The 
requirement for a priori information is explained by necessity to verify somehow whether the decrypted image is 
restored well for each sequential change of the key parameters of the optical scheme at each iteration of the breaking 
process. From there, it is evident, that there is a need in any reasonably adequate criteria, which should be based on 
some information about the original image or images (if they are single-type images). We describe four proposed 
criteria in the following subsections. 
2.1. The criterion based on the known statistical distribution of the original data 
Statistical analysis may be selected as the 1st of the proposed criteria, if the statistical distribution of the original 
data follows the known law. For example, may be known, that the distributions of the original images corresponds 
to the Gaussian noise fairly accurate, which can be explained due to the peculiarities of the algorithm used to 
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the number of the counts of the histogram of the restored image is greater than the number of the halftones in the 
original image, the discrete line spectrum on the histogram corresponds to the precise reconstruction. The other two 
criteria use the analysis related to the spatial domain of the restored images: it is the criterion based on the enlarged 
sampling frequency in the spatial domain and the criterion based on the existence of the known spatial structures in 
the original images. For example these criteria will be useful in the case of QR-codes or the redundant precoding of 
the source images. In contrast to the known techniques for the numerical breaking DRPE data without use of the 
brute-force method, there is no need of a direct access to the pairs of the source and encrypted images to use the 
proposed criteria. Some a priori known information about the source images is only necessary: color depth (for the 
criterion based on the analysis of the histogram), the size of the area of m × m (when the redundant precoding of 
data is used) or just the fact of the usage of the QR-codes. All proposed criteria can be applicable not only in the 
grayscale case, but also in the case of the color imaging, when each color channel contains the separated encrypted 
image of the source data. 
In this work, we only want to demonstrate a particular way of looking at the problem of the breaking DRPE data, 
and we want to present some arguments in favor of that way. 
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